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Abstract
This paper discusses the co-evolution of social strategies and
an efﬁciency trait in spatial evolutionary games. The continu-
ous efﬁciency trait determines how well a player can convert
gains from a prisoner’s dilemma game into evolutionary ﬁt-
ness. It is assumed to come at a cost proportional to its mag-
nitude and this cost is deducted from payoff. We demonstrate
that cost ranges exist such that the regime in which cooper-
ation can persist is strongly extended by the co-evolution of
efﬁciencies and strategies. We ﬁnd that cooperation typically
associates with large efﬁciencies while defection tends to pair
with lower efﬁciencies. The simulations highlight that social
dilemma situations in structured populations can be resolved
in a natural way: the nature of the dilemma itself leads to dif-
ferential pressures for efﬁciency improvement in cooperator
and defector populations. Cooperators beneﬁt by larger im-
provements which allow them to survive even in the face of
inferior performance in the social dilemma. Importantly, the
mechanism is possible with and without the presence of noise
in the evolutionary replication process.
Introduction
Altruism – acting for the beneﬁt of the group even if costly
to the individual – is a widespread phenomenon in social
and biological systems. Examples range from simple micro-
organisms (Crespi, 2001) up to complex social interactions
in society (Beinhocker, 2007). Various aspects of under-
standing the emergence and sustainability of such behaviour
still poses a major challenge to evolutionary game theory
(Weibull, 1996) and recent decades have seen very active re-
search in the ﬁeld (Wang et al., 2012; Szolnoki et al., 2009a;
Szolnoki and Szabo, 2004; Tanimoto and Yamauchi, 2010;
Masuda, 2007; Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Tanimoto
and Yamauchi, 2012; Santos et al., 2006a; Zimmermann and
Egu´ ıluz, 2005; Brede, 2011b; Perc and Wang, 2010; Wang
and Perc, 2010; Szolnoki et al., 2009b; Szolnoki and Szab´ o,
2007; Brede, 2011a; Cao et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2010;
Szolnoki et al., 2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2008; Szabo and
Hauert, 2002; Perc and Szolnoki, 2008; Santos et al., 2006b;
Brede, 2013b; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009; Szolnoki et al.,
2012; Chadefaux and Helbing, 2010).
Models of the evolution of cooperation often build on the
paradigmatic scenario described in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Inthesimpleone-offgametwoplayersareconfrontedwitha
simultaneous choice between two pure strategies, frequently
labelled as “C” (for cooperate) and “D” (for defect). De-
pending on the combinations of choices, payoffs from the
game are as follows. Mutual cooperation is rewarded with a
payoff of R for both players, a player who plays “D” against
“C” receives the temptation to defect T while the cooperator
is paid the sucker’s payoff S and mutual defection results in
a payment of P for both players. For the prisoner’s dilemma
the ranking of payoffs is T>R>P>Sand 2R>T+S,
such that the optimal choice for an individual who wants to
maximize its own game outcome is always “D” while “C” is
the optimal choice of a central planner interested in the good
of the group.
A common explanation for the sustainability of coopera-
tive strategies assumes positive assortment such that strate-
gies of the same type can interact more often than when
population structures are well mixed, cf. e.g., (Eshel and
Cavalli-Sforza, 1983; Nowak and M., 1992). Such posi-
tive assortment can be facilitated by ‘network reciprocity’
in structured populations (Nowak, 2006; Szab´ o and Fath,
2007). Especially since the classiﬁcation of prototypical
network structures, like scale-free and small-world type net-
works, evolutionary game theory in structured populations
has found growing interest. An important discovery in this
line of research has been that cooperative strategies can re-
ceive a strong boost in populations that are coupled by very
heterogeneousnetworks(Santosetal.,2006b), butnoticethe
role of game participation costs in this effect (Masuda, 2007;
Tanimoto and Yamauchi, 2010). Later work clariﬁed that
also other types of heterogeneity, e.g. in abilities of players
to generate payoff (Perc and Szolnoki, 2008; Brede, 2011a)
or in differing abilities of players to pass on strategies or
adapt to neighbours (Szolnoki and Szab´ o, 2007; Wang and
Perc, 2010; Perc and Wang, 2010; Tanimoto and Yamauchi,
2012), can give similar support for cooperation, even if the
network of social interactions is regular.
Some recent studies have started to focus on the question
how heterogeneity and game strategies can co-evolve, see
(Perc and Szolnoki, 2010) for a review. The most prominent
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in which social interactions change at a timescale similar to
that of the evolution of game strategies (Zimmermann and
Egu´ ıluz, 2005; Santos et al., 2006a; Van Segbroek et al.,
2008; Cao et al., 2011). A crucial assumption in these mod-
els is that agents have the cognitive abilities to break off un-
desirable ties.
Other models have considered the co-evolution of slow
and fast strategy pass, e.g. via considering age-dependent
abilities of agents (Wang et al., 2012), the co-evolution of
performance evaluation rules (Brede, 2013b) or reinforce-
ment of the position of abilities of agents who success-
fully passed on their strategies in past interactions (Szol-
noki and Perc, 2008; Szolnoki et al., 2010; Zhang et al.,
2010). As noted in (Brede, 2013a), common to these ap-
proaches is an assumption of a dynamics similar to Heb-
bian learning (Hebb, 1949): Successful interactions become
stronger while unsuccessful interactions tend to decline in
frequency. Whilst such processes based on Hebbian learn-
ing may be reasonable models of social interactions in many
contexts, they still rest on ad-hoc assumptions (i.e. those
of a Hebbian-like dynamics of system structure, or abili-
ties to break unproﬁtable links (Van Segbroek et al., 2008)
or some mechanism to inﬂuence group formation (Pow-
ers et al., 2011)) and do not provide a purely evolutionary
framework that describes the co-evolution of system struc-
ture and social strategies via the same mechanism of evolu-
tion. Further, many of these models can only support coop-
eration if additionally constrained: I.e. in adaptive network
models connectivities are typically held constant, or in the
ageing-based models maximum ages are imposed, or in the
reinforcement model the rate of reinforcement is found to be
required to be within a certain range for optimal support of
cooperation.
A recent paper addresses this gap and proposes a model in
which traits of slow and fast strategy pass of agents can co-
evolve with social strategies to support cooperation (Brede,
2013a). The paper proposes a framework in which agents
can enhance their abilities to pass on strategies, albeit at a
cost. Considering the binary options of ’advertising’ (i.e.
investing in fast strategy spread at a cost) or not advertising
(i.e. normal strategy spread at no cost) the study demon-
strates that cost-regimes exist, such that cooperation can as-
sociate with costly fast strategy spread while this is not vi-
able for defection. It is easy to understand why this is the
case: In comparison to defectors cooperators beneﬁt from
an investment to surround themselves with like types and
thus they can afford to invest more in costly strategy pass
than defectors. Hence, if strategy pass is costly enough, the
usual competition between cooperators and defectors is re-
placed by a competition between fast spreading cooperators
and slow spreading defectors, resulting in an evolutionary
beneﬁtto theformer. The modelof (Brede,2013a)considers
a binary choice (i.e. advertise or don’t advertise). Further,
the cooperation-supporting dynamics of (Brede, 2013a) re-
lies on the crucial assumption of noise in strategy replication
without which the mechanism of costly advertising cannot
operate and the model is very sensitive to assumptions about
joint inheritence of the advertising and the social strategies.
In this paper we consider a slightly altered modelling
framework and illustrate that a co-evolutionary dynamics of
agents with to a different extent enhanced abilities to gener-
atepayoff fromthegamecan supportcooperationeven with-
out these key ingredients of (Brede, 2013a), i.e. without the
assumption of binary strategies, and without the assumption
of noise in strategy replication.
Model
Consider a spatially distributed population of N = L ×
L agents that interact with their von Neumann neigh-
bours. Agents are chacterized by social strategies s ∈
{C,D} which they employ when playing a one-off pris-
oner’s dilemma game with their neighbours. The game is
parametrized in the conventional way via R =1 , T =1+r,
S = −r and P =0 . As usual the parameter r ∈ (0,1)
characterises the dilemma strength.
Every round an agent i earns payoff π from interactions
with all four spatial neighbours. Further, every agent i is
characterised by a trait ￿i that determines the efﬁciency with
which it can convert payoff gleaned from the game into evo-
lutionary ﬁtness f such that
fi = (1 + b￿i)(πi − c￿i). (1)
The motivation for Eq. (1) is that every agent has a de-
fault mechanism to convert payoff into ﬁtness at unit rate
(represented by the term πi in the expansion of (1)). How-
ever, after playing the game it can also invest an amount
c￿i into higher efﬁciency conversion. Hence, after playing
the PD game, a cost c￿i is deducted from game payoff and
then the remaining payoff is converted into ﬁtness. An al-
ternative model is that the cost of efﬁciency improvements
is deducted after payoff is converted into ﬁtness, resulting
in fi = (1 + b￿i)πi − c￿i. Both models result in qualita-
tively similar dynamics and we focus on the ﬁrst choice in
this paper.
In our model the trait ￿i represents the ‘biological ma-
chinery’ to make use of payoff from the game, b measures
its efﬁciency, and c is the cost (per unit of ￿) to maintain
it. In a biological context the cost of enhanced efﬁciencies
could be seen as a cost to maintain a certain body mass, in a
social context it might be associated with the maintenance of
equipment or a cost to acquire certain skills. The assumption
of a linear relationship between the size of the trait and the
cost is for simplicity, in general it might be more reasonable
toassumeadifferentmonotonicnon-linearrelationships, but
this will not alter qualitative results.
We then carry out evolutionary simulations based on the
following protocol:
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with probability 1/2 agents are assigned the social strat-
egy C and with probability 1/2 social strategy D. Agents
are also initialized with efﬁciency traits ￿ selected uni-
formly at random from the interval [0,1].
• Afocusagentiispickedatrandomfromthepopulationof
N agents and one of its neighbours is selected at random
as a reference agent j.
• Focus’ and reference agent’s payoffs πi and πj are evalu-
ated and converted into evolutionary ﬁtness according to
Eq. (1).
• With probability
P(j → i)=
exp(fj/κ)
exp(fj/κ) + exp(fi/κ)
(2)
the focus agent i will adopt the reference agent j’s traits,
i.e. the social strategy sj and the efﬁciency trait ￿j of j.
As introduced in (Szab´ o and Toke, 1998) the parameter
κ in (2) gives the noise level in the process of strategy
spread. For κ =0superior performers always replace
worse performers, if κ>0 also less successful strategies
have an occasional chance to invade a neighbours place.
Note, that the noise parameter is of importance to contrast
the present results with those of (Brede, 2013a), because
the results of (Brede, 2013a) are not robust in the limit
κ → 0 of (up to neighbour selection) deterministic updat-
ing.
• The process of game play and replication is iterated till a
quasistationary state is reached and then average frequen-
cies of cooperators and defectors and equilibrium aver-
ages over the evolutionary trait are calculated from a suf-
ﬁcient number of further iterations.
• The entire experiment is then repeated a sufﬁcient num-
ber of times to evaluate from how many random initial
conditions cooperation could evolve.
Numerical results presented below are generally obtained
from simulations on 200 × 200 tori and b =2and have
been repeated for at least 50 times to obtain estimates of the
frequency of situations in which cooperation can arise.
Results
This section describes and analyses numerical results ob-
tained by simulations of the model introduced above. Fig-
ure 1 compares average trajectories of the co-evolution of
the efﬁciency trait and social strategies for a case when the
efﬁciency trait is costly and another in which it comes for
free. Both scenarios are for the case of noiseless replica-
tion κ =0 . Notably, if efﬁciency is not costly, both co-
operators (open boxes) and defectors (ﬁlled boxes) evolve
to maximize efﬁciencies. Asymptotically, this results in a
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Figure 1: Co-evolution of social strategies and efﬁciency
traits for (top) r =0 .01 and cost c =0and (bottom) r =0 .1
and cost c =1for κ =0 . Average trajectories for the
density of cooperators nc and the average efﬁciency trait of
cooperators ￿C and defectors ￿D have been calculated from
sampling the stochastic dynamics of the evolution over 1000
independent runs on a 200 × 200 torus. For comparison the
ﬁgure also contains the average evolution of cooperators in
the standard one-off spatial game with κ =0and r =0 .01.
Note the logarithmic scale for the time domain.
homogeneous system in which payoffs are scaled by a fac-
tor 1+b and cooperative strategies cannot survive for even
very low dilemma toughness (r =0 .01 in this case). Inter-
estingly, however, one also notes that in the initial stages
of the dynamics average efﬁciencies of cooperators grow
faster than those of defectors. The reason for this is sim-
ple: As extinction pressures are larger on cooperators than
on defectors, also the evolutionary pressure on inefﬁcient
cooperators is larger than on inefﬁcient defectors (which, if
favourably positioned, can occasionally generate more ﬁt-
ness than efﬁcient defectors at less favourable locations).
The delayed saturation of efﬁciencies of defectors and co-
operators leads to a dynamics that is different from the usual
evolution in the one-off game (cf. the ﬁlled circles in Fig.
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ating with larger efﬁciencies than defectors and hence they
can recover from the initial decline which is caused by the
assortment dynamics after starting from random initial con-
ditions. However, the recovery of cooperation is stopped as
defectors evolve towards saturation in the efﬁciency trait and
cooperators become extinct when a homogeneous state with
￿ =1is reached in the entire population.
The bottom panel of Fig. 1 contrasts the co-evolution of
social strategies and efﬁciencies for c =1and a much more
severe dilemma setting with r =0 .1 to the above scenario
of a free efﬁciency trait with c =0 . For a better visual un-
derstanding also some snapshots in the evolution which cor-
respond to important stages of the dynamics are illustrated
in Fig. 2. One ﬁrst notices the difference in the asymp-
totic states: For costly efﬁciencies cooperation can survive
in a regime far beyond dilemma strengths which typically
support cooperation in the spatial game with κ =0 . Con-
comitantly, cooperators associate with a saturated efﬁciency
whereas defection is typically paired with much lower val-
ues of the efﬁciency trait. The course of the evolution is
also different from the scenario with a free efﬁciency trait
and proceeds in several stages. First, as typical in the evo-
lution of cooperation in spatial games, when strategies are
randomly mixed cooperators are easily exploited by defec-
tors and hence cooperation declines until assortment of like
strategies is reached. In the process only cooperators with
large efﬁciencies survive in small islands (Fig. 2 top right,
which corresponds to the minimum in the number of coop-
erators in Fig. 1) in a sea of defectors. Within the sea of de-
fectors low efﬁciency investments are favoured (as there is
hardly any game payoff to be leveraged) and large efﬁciency
defectors only survive in very small numbers when attaching
to clusters of cooperators. In a second stage, large efﬁciency
cooperators can expand into the sea of low efﬁciency defec-
tors, conquering a very large share of the entire system (Fig.
2, bottom right, corresponding to the maximum in coopera-
tion in Fig. 1). With some delay this allows large efﬁciency
defectors to expand and eventially a stationary balance of
ordered arrangements of large and low efﬁciency defectors
and large efﬁciency cooperators is reached (Fig. 2 bottom
left).
These initial simulations illustrate an important point: A
co-evolutionary dynamics of costly efﬁciencies and social
strategies can allow cooperation to survive far beyond the
regime normally supported by network reciprocity. The ori-
gin of the support mechanism is that evolution favours efﬁ-
ciency enhancements in clusters of cooperators. Since coop-
erators beneﬁt from surrounding themselves with like strate-
gies, paying a cost to surround themselves with other coop-
erators is an evolutionary viable strategy that outcompetes
the cooperate strategy that does not invest into efﬁciency en-
hancements. For defectors the situation is different. When
not in contact with cooperators, defectors which invest into
efﬁciency enhancements are outcompeted by defectors who
don’t. However, only efﬁcient defectors manage to pene-
trate clusters of efﬁcient cooperators and thus a cyclic dom-
inance (efﬁcient cooperators beat inefﬁcient defectors, but
are beaten by efﬁcient defectors who are in turn outcom-
peted by inefﬁcient defectors) similar to Rock-papers scis-
sors (Szolnoki and Szabo, 2004), volunteering (Szabo and
Hauert, 2002) or the advertising game of (Brede, 2013a)
is created. As one would expect, the balance between the
three competing strategies can be shifted when modifying
the cost parameter. Interestingly, however, in a large cost
regime high efﬁciency defectors can easily be pushed into
extinction and for low frequencies of recurring invasions co-
operators can dominate the system over large time periods.
For a more comprehensive investigation, in Fig. 3 the
phase diagrams that give the dependence of the frequency
of cooperators nc on the dilemma toughness are evaluated
for low, intermediate, and high noise levels in strategy repli-
cation. Going hand in hand with this Fig. 4 gives the de-
pendence of stationary average efﬁciencies on the dilemma
toughness parameter r. Both, the nc(r) curves in Fig. 3 and
the ￿C(r) and ￿D(r) curves in Fig. 4 are given for various
cost assumptions.
For the case of noiseless replication with κ =0several
sharp transitions can be discerned. First, comparing curves
for various cost choices it is worth noting that cooperation
and efﬁciencies can co-evolve for any cost c>0. This is
illustrated by the ﬁrst panel in Fig. 3: Whereas coopera-
tion dies out for r>0 for c =0cooperation can survive
up to around r ≈ 0.45 if a small cost c =0 .0001 is in-
cluded (and in fact in the limit κ → 0 in Eq. (2) any cost
makes sure efﬁcient defectors can be invaded by ￿ =0de-
fectors, thusallowingforthecyclicaldominancemechanism
to operate). As further illustrated in Fig. 5 this is differ-
ent for κ>0. The more noise in strategy propagation, the
larger the cost required to allow cooperation to survive. On
the one hand larger costs help the evolution of cooperation
since they make it easier for inefﬁcient defectors to chase
efﬁcient defectors, hence reducing the pressure on efﬁcient
cooperators and allowing them to thrive. However, on the
other hand costs above some threshold make efﬁciency in-
vestments unviable for both cooperators and defectors. As
a consequence a range of costs exists for which cooperation
is optimally supported. The dependence of cooperation on
dilemma costs also includes a transition which demarcates a
phase in which efﬁcient defectors typically survive the intial
stages of the dynamics from another phase in which they go
extinct (cf. Fig. 5). When efﬁcient defectors die out, the
cyclical competition is replaced by a competition between
efﬁcient cooperators and inefﬁcient defectors in which the
former can dominate. Hence, for some cost range a state
in which only cooperators survive is reached. This state is
marked by homogeneity in agent’s efﬁciencies, and hence it
is not stable to the reinvasion of defectors. In fact, including
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ECAL 2013 162Figure 2: Typical snapshots in the arrangement of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) at various stages of the co-evolution.
Clockwise from top right to bottom left: initial conditions at t =0 , then snapshots at t = 42, t = 120, and the asymptotic state
at t = 3000.The intensity of the color of the sites indicates the efﬁciency trait: dark blue corresponds to cooperators with large
￿, light blue to cooperators with low ￿, and dark red and light red refer to large ￿ and low ￿ defectors, respectively.
invasions of agents with randomly selected strategies, large
amplitude oscilations between regimes in which cooperation
dominates and regimes in which invading defectors can take
over large parts of the system result.
Second, for κ =0the nc−r phase diagrams in Fig. 3 and
the corresponding ￿ − r diagrams in Fig. 4 show a number
of sharp transitions in the r-dependencies. Whereas coop-
erators always evolve into a monochromatic population (not
shown), the defector population tends to become separated
into groups of defectors with high (￿ = ￿C) and low (￿ =0 )
efﬁciency. When the dilemma strength is increased, propor-
tions of low and high efﬁciency defectors shift, but the val-
ues of the group-characteristic efﬁciency values ￿ =0and
￿ = ￿C remain the same. The ﬁrst order transitions in the
nc − r dependencies indicate critical values of the dilemma
strengths at which sudden shifts in the relative proportions
of low and high efﬁciency defectors take place.
Most notable, in particular for larger costs, is the tran-
sition at which high efﬁciency defectors become extinct
(i.e. at which ￿D ≈ 0). The effect is similar to what
we have discussed for the nc − c dependencies in Fig.
5 above: Without the presence of high efﬁciency defec-
tors low efﬁciency defectors are outcompeted by high ef-
ﬁciency cooperators and the latter can dominate the popula-
tion. Whereas efﬁciency investments generally decline with
increasing dilemma toughness, due to the efﬁciency compe-
tition in the now purely cooperative population, maximum
efﬁciencies are favoured by evolution.
With the exception of smoother transitions between the
various regimes, principally similar behaviour to the case
of κ =0is observed for intermediate and high levels of
noise. The main difference is that more noise in strategy
propagation requires larger costs of the efﬁciency trait for
cooperation to persist.
Last, it is worthwhile examining whether the co-
evolutionary mechanism is robust when strategy traits are
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Figure 3: Dependence of the average stationary frequency
of cooperators on the dilemma toughness r for noise levels
in strategy updating κ =0(no noise), κ =0 .1 (low amount
of noise), and κ =1(large amount of noise). The depen-
dencies are given for a range of cost parameters c for the
efﬁciency trait. Note, that for c =0and κ =0and κ =0 .1
cooperation can only survive for r =0(open boxes).
inherited separately. To investigate this issue we consider an
amended model in which the rules for passing on the social
strategy s and the efﬁciency trait ￿ are modiﬁed. If a focus
agent copies from a reference agent (i.e. according to Eq.
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Figure 4: Dependence of the average stationary evolved
efﬁciency traits of defectors (labelled as “D”, ﬁlled sym-
bols) and cooperators (labelled as “C”, open symbols) on
the dilemma toughness. (top) For κ =0 .for two cost scenar-
ios, very low cost c =0 .0001 (boxes) and high cost c =1
(circles), (middle) for κ =0 .1 and low c =0 .5 (boxes)
and high c =2(circles) costs, (bottom) for κ =1and low
c =0 .5 (boxes) and high c =1 .5 (circles) costs.
(2)), with probability pd only either the efﬁciency trait or the
social strategy are imitated. In the opposite case, i.e. with
probability 1−pd, both traits are simultaneously passed on.
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Figure 5: Dependence of cooperation on the cost of efﬁ-
ciencies for r =0 .1 and several levels of noise in strategy
propagation.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
r
pd=0
pd=0.01
pd=0.10
pd=0.20
pd=0.30
Figure 6: Dependence of cooperation on the dilemma tough-
ness for various degrees of disjoint strategy pass pd for
c =0 .0001 and κ =0 .
Hence the new parameter pd classiﬁes the degree of disjoint
strategy pass, with pd =0corresponding to the previously
considered model and pd =1corresponding to completely
disjoint strategy pass. Figure 6 illustrates some simulation
experiments in which scenarios with pd > 0 were explored.
Clearly, disjoint strategy pass equalizes differences in efﬁ-
ciencies between cooperators and defectors, hence reducing
support for cooperation. However, in contrast to the adver-
tising game of Brede (2013a), cooperation can persist for
rather substantial degrees of disjoint strategy transfer, thus
adding robustness to previous results.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have considered a model for the co-
evolution of social strategies and an efﬁciency trait that de-
termines how well agents can convert gains from dilemma
games into evolutionary payoff. Through a series of con-
trolled simulation experiments we have demonstrated that
the co-evolution of efﬁciencies and social strategies can add
substantial support to cooperation, if the payoff efﬁciency
costs are within a certain range. Maximum and minimum
costs that demarcate the cost window are dependent on noise
in strategy replication, with lower noise generally allowing
for a larger range of cooperation-supporting costs.
Even though based on a well-known cyclical dominance
mechanism that has already been explored elsewhere (Szol-
noki and Szabo, 2004; Szabo and Hauert, 2002), the present
paper adds some signiﬁcant extensions to the work of
(Brede, 2013a). First, the change in the model from a trait
that purely biases strategy spread to a trait that effects pay-
off generation adds an interesting aspect. The present paper
demonstrates that pressures to enhance efﬁciencies are not
the same for cooperators and defectors involved in evolu-
tionary dilemmas on graphs. We demonstrate that the na-
ture of the social game favours the evolution toward higher
efﬁciencies in the cooperator population, and this, in turn,
allows cooperation to survive.
Second, one might wonder whether the binary strategies
imposed in (Brede, 2013a) constrain stationary states to set-
tings that could not have been reached by the evolution of
a continuous trait. We demonstrate here that this is not the
case: A continuous efﬁciency trait can co-evolve with social
strategies to support cooperation. The main difference com-
pared to the binary setting is that stationary efﬁciency levels
of the subpopulations self-organize to evolutionarily stable
levels.
Third, the model presented in this paper demonstrates
that the basic cooperation-supporting mechanism of (Brede,
2013a), i.e. that cooperators can afford to pay more for
costly replication than defectors, is in fact more general
than originally highlighted in the model based on learning
and teaching. We show here that an equivalent mechanism
based on costly efﬁciency improvents can also operate in
evolutionary dynamics that are free of noise. For instance,
some preliminary simulations indicate that qualitative re-
sults are robust for asynchronous updating based on ‘imi-
tate the best’, for which no cooperation can survive in the
standard spatial game (Huberman and Glance, 1993).
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the use of the IRIDIS High Perfor-
mance Computing Facility, and associated support services
at the University of Southampton, in the completion of this
work. .
References
Abramson, G. and Kuperman, M. (2001). Social games in a social
network. Phys. Rev. E, 63:030901.
Beinhocker, E. (2007). The origin of wealth. Random House, Lon-
don.
ECAL - General Track
165 ECAL 2013Brede, M. (2011a). The evolution of cooperation on correlated
payoff landscapes. Artiﬁcial Life, 17:365–373.
Brede, M. (2011b). Playing against the ﬁttest: A simple strategy
that promotes the emergence of cooperation. EPL, 94:30003.
Brede, M. (2013a). Costly advertising and the evolu-
tion of cooperation. PLoS ONE, available online:
http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067056.
Brede, M. (2013b). Short versus long term beneﬁts and the evo-
lution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. PLoS
ONE, 8(2):e56016.
Cao, L., Ohtsuki, H., Wang, B., and Kazuyuki, A. (2011). Evo-
lution of cooperation on adaptively weighted networks. J.
Theor. Biol., 272:8–15.
Chadefaux, T. and Helbing, D. (2010). How wealth accumultion
can promote cooperation. PLoS ONE, 5:e13471.
Crespi, B. J. (2001). The evolution of social behavior in microor-
ganisms. Trends in ecology & evolution, 16(4):178–183.
Eshel, I. and Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1983). Assortment of encoun-
ters and evolution of cooperativeness. PNAS, 79:1331–1335.
Hebb, D. (1949). The organization of behaviour. John Wiley &
Sons, London.
Huberman, B. A. and Glance, N. S. (1993). Evolutionary games
and computer simulations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA,
90:7716–7718.
Masuda, N. (2007). Participation costs dismiss the advantage of
heterogenous networks in the evolution of cooperation. Proc.
R. Soc. B, 274:1815–1821.
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.
Science, 314:1560–1563.
Nowak, M. A. and M., M. R. (1992). Evolutionary games and
spatial chaos. Nature, 359:826–829.
Perc, M. and Szolnoki, A. (2008). Social diversity and promotion
of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys.
Rev. E, 77:011904.
Perc, M. and Szolnoki, A. (2010). Coevolutionary games - a mini
review. BioSystems, 99:109–125.
Perc, M. and Wang, Z. (2010). Heterogenous aspirations promote
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. PLoS ONE,
5:e15117.
Powers, S. T., Penn, A. S., and Watson, R. A. (2011). The concur-
rent evolution of cooperation and the population structures
that support it. Evolution, 65:1527–1543.
Santos, F., Pacheco, J., and Lenaerts, T. (2006a). Cooperation pre-
vails when individuals adjust their social ties. PLoS Comput.
Biol., 2:1284–1291.
Santos, F. C., Rodrigues, J., and Pacheco, J. (2006b). Graph topol-
ogy plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation.
Proc. R. Soc. B, 273:51–55.
Szab´ o, G. and Fath, G. (2007). Evolutionary games on graphs.
Phys. Rep., 446:97–216.
Szabo, G. and Hauert, C. (2002). Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
games with voluntary participation. Phys. Rev. E, 66:062903.
Szab´ o, G. and Toke, C. (1998). Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game on a square lattice. Phys. Rev. E, 58:69–73.
Szolnoki, A. and Perc, M. (2008). Coevolution of teaching activity
promotes cooperation. New J. Phys., 10:043036.
Szolnoki, A. and Szabo, G. (2004). Phase transitions for rock-
scissors-paper game on different networks. Phys. Rev. E,
70:037102.
Szolnoki, A. and Szab´ o, G. (2007). Cooperation enhanced by in-
homogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma game. EPL, 77:30004.
Szolnoki, A., Vukov, J., and Szabo, G. (2009a). Selection of noise
level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas. Phys.
Rev. E, 80:056112.
Szolnoki, A., Vukov, J., and Szab´ o, G. (2009b). Selection of noise
level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas. Phys.
Rev. E, 80:056112.
Szolnoki, A., Wang, Z., and Perc, M. (2012). Wisdom of groups
promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. Sci.
Rep., 2:576.
Szolnoki, A., Wang, Z., Wang, J., and Zhu, X. (2010). Dy-
namically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner’s
dilemma games. Phys. Rev. E, 82:036110.
Tanimoto, J. and Yamauchi, A. (2010). Does “game participa-
tion cost” affect the advantage of heterogenous networks for
evolving cooperation? Physica A, 389:2284–2289.
Tanimoto, J.and Brede, M. and Yamauchi, A. (2012). Network
reciprocity by coexisting learning and teaching strategies.
Phys. Rev. E, 85:032101.
Van Segbroeck, S., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., and Pacheco, J. M.
(2009). Reacting differently to adverse ties promotes cooper-
ation in social networks. Phys. Rev. Lett., 102:058105.
Van Segbroek, S., Santos, F. C., A., N., Pacheco, J. M., and
Lenaerts, T. (2008). The evolution of prompt reaction to ad-
verse ties. BMC Evolutionary Biology, 8:1–8.
Wang, Z. and Perc, M. (2010). Aspiring to the ﬁttest and promotion
of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys. Rev. E,
82:002115.
Wang, Z., Zhu, X., and Arenzon, J. J. (2012). Cooperation and age
structure in spatial games. Phys. Rev. E, 85:011149.
Weibull, J. (1996). Evolutionary game theory. MIT University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Zhang, H., Small, M., Yang, H., and Wang, B. (2010). Adjust-
ing learning motivation to promote cooperation. Physica A,
389:4734–4739.
Zimmermann, M. and Egu´ ıluz, V. M. (2005). Cooperation, so-
cial networks, and the emergence of leadership in a prisoner’s
dilemma game with adaptive local interactions. Phys. Rev. E,
72:056118.
ECAL - General Track
ECAL 2013 166